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INTRODUCTION 
For several years, economists have been debating how well Federal 
tax policy changes have performed in readjusting the economy. Tax change 
policies have been instituted periodically since World War II up to the 
very present. The goals sought by the legislators have varied. The tax 
cut policy in the Kennedy administration was set up to invigorate a re-
cessionary economy. Under the Reagan administration, tax cuts are a tool 
to increase savings and investment. Part of the reason for the inc on-
sistency in policy aims is due to the lack of consensus on how a tax cut 
will perform in a given period . Most predictive models ignore the state of 
the economy at the time, the degree of consumer optimism, and lags in the 
adjustment of consumer expectations . These variables are vital in 
determining the consumers' reactions to a given tax cut during a given 
economic phase . Moreover, whether consumers can even distinguish the 
windfalls from a tax cut apart from increases in take home pay from a wage 
hike, is a matter of debate. 
Recent discussions have been focused on the temporal nature of the 
tax cuts. The significance of the issue seems real enough such that cuts 
are determined and categorized according to their permanent or transitory 
nature of< Consumer spending after a tax reduction that is permanent or one 
that is temporary (either a one-shot rebate or a cut specified to last for 
one_ or two years) , can be measured to see whether each has a distinctive 
effect on consumer spending. The widely accepted r~rmanent Inco~e Hypothesis 
(PIH) states that transitory changes have their main impact on saving and 
not on consumption. Permanent Income on which consumer spending is based; is 
a ,veighted average of consumers ' past incomes, for consumption patterns 
take time to readjust to increments in today·s income . Given this view, a 
.. I vlouid like to thank Jarvis Babcock, Luis Fernandez , and James Zinser 
for their helpful suggestions on how to address this topic . 
• 
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temp~rary tax cut will barely have an effect on permanent income , since the 
change is known to be temporary. Consumption will then proceed in the same 
direction as if there had been no tax change at all . Macroeconomists argue 
that a rise in income stimulates consumer spending. A tax cut is easily 
associated with the growth of consumer spending, if one agrees with the 
premise that consumers have treated the increase in take-horne pay from the 
tax cut in the same way they treat increases in their take-home pay from 
other sources (Okun, 1971). Given the supposition that consumers plan their 
spending patterns over a horizon, the consumers would calculate a larger 
spending increase today, knowing that they will attain the same tax cut 
in each future period. 
There are challenges to the permanent income theory and additional 
qualifications to be made about the effect of a tax cut: 
First, consumers do not necessarily make temporary/permanent income 
distinctions for each change in government policy which affects their 
income . This is especially true if the change is of uncertain duration 
and is of a trivial amount relative to their level of income. Thus, con-
sumers may be either too myopic or may not want to incur the cost of including 
a temporary tax change into their consumption horizon. 
Second, consumption measured by the flow of services, may lead to a 
different consumption effect than consumption based on consumer spendin<;J. 
In practice, consumption is defined as consumer expenditures of nondurables 
and services plus an estimate on the imputed flow of services from the 
existing stock of durable goods. Saved temporary tax cuts may very likely 
take the form of investment in consumer durables . In such a case , a temporary 
tax cut may actually stimulate consumer spending by a substantial amount . 
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The PIH is a theoretical relationship between income and consumption. More 
specifically, the dependent variable should be consumption as estimated by 
expenditures less durab1es. Net investment in consumer durab1es is a component 
of spending, but is not a part of consumption. 
A third qualification concerns the size- of any windfall . A number of 
economists feel that there is a significant difference between the effect 
of 'big' versus ' little' windfalls on consumption with the larger windfalls 
being treated in a way compatible with the PIH. The smaller tax cuts, are 
thus hypothesised to be saved by consumers, and do not affect a consumer's 
permanent income. According to empirical evidence, large windfalls will have 
a significant effect on consumption whereas small windfalls will not effectively 
change either permanent income or consumption (Juster, 1977 ). 
Other miscellaneous qualifications inclUde: consumers who . are con-
strained by liquidity and may react strongly to even temporary tax changes ; 
consumer skepticism, whereby consumers may not always believe the announced 
duration of a tax cut; lastly, tp~ rational - spending horizon may in fact be 
shorter than the PIH creators envision. If so, the temporary changes may 
have a more substantial effect on consumption than theory predicts . 
4 . 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
The first true empirical study of consumer responses to tax cuts was 
undertaken by Arthur Okun (1 971) while he was on the staff of Presidential 
Economi c Advisers. He revealed the effectiveness of the 1968 surtax in con-
tracting a 'runaway' economy. Okun established that temporary tax changes 
were equally effective as any permanent tax changes had been. Consumer 
spending estimates were drawn from disaggregated consumption functions. 
His methodology in testing the efficacy of the surtax policy was to choose 
the better of two consumption simul~tion models: a full effect and a zero 
effect hypothesis were formulated. In the case of the full effect, deductions 
from personal disposable income due to a surcharge are treated like any other 
change in disposable income. At the other extreme, the zero <effect, a surtax 
~ould be wholly ignored by consumers and would be ineffective in curbing 
consumer spending during an inflationary period. 
Through a simulation proces s, Okun compared the, two sequences of consump-
t i on forecasts to the real world outcome in order to establish which model 
came closer to the actual spending patterns . Okun was able to confidently 
conclude that a surtax had a full effect on nondurables. The standard error 
for the full effect model was slightly lower in testing for durable goods . 
Hmvever, the degree of improvement was not substantial. Finally, beca1..lse the 
aut o boom occurred during the 1968 period independent of the surtax, Okun 
actua lly saw a positive relationship between the surtax and auto spending. 
Spending on autos rose concomitantly with the rise in taxation. The fact 
that spending could work independently of a tax policy raised the question of 
how reliable a ny tax policy can be. For economists, it necessitates formulating 
a model which does not ignore the ramifications of whether the economy is 
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undergoing a slump or is experiencing a period of prosperity. 
Okun and his successors (Juster, Modigliani, and Steindel ) al l tested for 
purely dichotomous, zero or one, differentials between a permanent and temporary 
tax change and consumption . Later studies beginning with Blinder would seek 
to measure the impact of a temporary cut in relation to a permanent cut. 
Thomas Juster (1977) applied a version of the Houthakker and Taylor saving 
model (1966 ) to compare the effects of the 1968 surcharge and the 1 975 tax 
cut on consumer expenditures . His tests were inappropriate for testing the PIH 
i n its pure form, but were relevant for testing the differential effects of 
tax changes on spending, which is the macro-policy question. His results in-
dicated that consumers do not differentiate between declared or announced 
permanent and temporary tax changes. Consumption effects for both permanent 
and temporary tax changes are spread through time, however Juster failed to 
note whether consumers are quicker in adjusting to a permanent cut as opposed 
to a transitory tax cut. 
As a direct contrast to Okun' s work Steindel and Modigliani (1977) 
concluded that a temporary tax cut has very little impact on consumption. 
Most of the spending effect is nat felt until at least a year after the tax 
cut is implemented. _ THe Modigliani-Steindel (M-S) Model was structured on 
the life-cycle hypothesis and was consistent with the PIR . Through a best-
fit methodology, it was found that the 1975:2 rebate did not produce prompt 
spending responSes, and was thus ineffective as a stimulus to consumption. 
Unl ike the Juster study, the M-S Model did not distinguish among changes in 
disposable income according to source. Without disaggregating disposable 
income, it was assumed thirt a tax rem te would affect consumption to the same 
degree as any other changes in income values WOUld. Three models, DRI, 
',. r. ~ -
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Michigan, and MPS were adapted along wi th the authors ' own model. The 
results of the study confirmed that the 1975 rebate did not induce consumer 
spending until the fifth quarter. Juster questions,the'substantiality 
of the study. He claims that the M-S equation underestimates the rise in 
consumer demand in 1975-6 beeause it does not model "the reduced uncertain-
ties faced by consumers during this period of recovery (Juster, 1977) ." 
A close look at the consumer spending data for this period tends to 
confirm that there was indeed a slowdown in consumer spending. Any effect 
resulting from a tax cut would have been latent, as the M-S model predicts . 
Consumers respond much the same to temporary and permanent tax changes 
given the frequent occurence of the latter. This is a claim made by Dolde 
(1979), and empirically tested by Juster (1977). Dolde focused on the issue 
that aggregate tax change responses need not be identical to changes in other 
incomes. In previous work, Dolde (1976) found that consumption of nondurables 
responded faster to tax changes than to other income changes. For example, 
he found that lags from tax liabilities last approximately 1 . 2 quarters. 
Other changes in income had a lag period of 2 . 2 quarters. Dolde points out 
that consumers learn about the permanence of a tax change by publicity, and 
thus there is more rapid communication of tax changes than of other income 
changes. As a consequence, he expects that consumers adjust their spending 
patterns more rapidly after a tax change. Moreover, because of the frequency 
of tax changes, the rational . conilmer's response to temporary tax changesare 
only slightly smaller than responses to non-tax changes which affect their in-
come. He cites the fact that the temporary tax changesof 1968 and 1975 were 
only two of a dozen major federal tax changes since 1945. 
Furthermore, there are indirect effects of unanticipated changes in 
current income, otherwise, households wou1d be indifferent whether changes 
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in income arise from labor, property, or tax cut income . In the aggregate 
he affirms that income type matters significantly and should be accounted for. He 
hypothesizes that the marginal propensity to consume can differ radically for 
consumers receiving income from different sources. This hypothesis is in 
contrast· to the view that most tax cuts are not 'perceived' by the consumer. 
A reduction in withholding rates may increase one's take-home pay, however 
one is often unable ta distinguish a tax cut gain from a rise in one's wage 
rate or an adjustment for inflation. 
For stabilization purposes, it is spending, not consumption which ie of 
interest (Dolde, 1979, Blinder, 1979). Dolde's dependent variable is the NIA's 
consumption of non-durable goods and services. He concludes that tax changes 
have larger and more rapid consumption effects than do n~tax changes in income . 
Dolde's main contributionto those attempting to forecast consumer responsed 
to stabilization policies is to outline the limitation of such a study. The 
difficulties are mechanical, for on balance, estimated distributed lag con-
sumption functions underestimate the speed and magnitude of the consumer's 
response to . stabilization policies. 
In a more recent study, Alan Blinder (1981), establishes a model which 
has built in , a priori, the theory that income sources deemed to be more 
permanent will elicit prompter/greater spending responses than inc sources 
deemed to be more temporary. Blinder builds a non-linear consumption func-
tion, distinguishing temporary taxes from other income (factor income and 
transfer payments). Although Blinder's empirical results contain unavoidably 
large standard errors, he comes away with point estimates which weigh tem-
porary tax changes as a 50% \veight of a normal, permanent tax change. A 
temporary tax change within a year is estimated to have only half the impact 
on consumption of a permanent tax change of equal magnitude. Based on one 
quarter of data alone, he estimates that the 1975:2 rebate had only 38% the 
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impact of a permanent tax cut . The estimated percentages are derived from the 
ratio of the temporary tax change parameter over the permanent tax change 
parameter. 
Because Blinder was less interested in testing the PIH itself, he used 
unfiltered consumer spending as a dependent variable rather than pure con-
sumption. He found the spending variable to be appropriate in a study which 
focused on stabilization policy. Thus, his parameters include the effects of 
durables and non-durables . 
Disposable income, a right hand side determinant is segregated into two 
categories: regular and special windfall income. Special windfalls arising 
from tax cuts are the topic of analysis. Very simply, his model includes a 
coefficient which depends on both the quarter, t, and on the specific tax 
under consideration. Blinder uses a dummy variable to test the impact of 
each special tax. For Blinder, the special taxes include the 1968 surcharge 
and the 1975-6 tax cuts. Windfalls are defined as the disposable income gain 
or loss in quarter, t, as the result of an unexpected tax change. 
The structural model contains non-stock market and stock-market wealth, 
and regular and special incomes as the main explanatory variables. Blinder's 
regression showed how the 1975-76 tax cuts contributed to the sudden drop of 
the APe and its subsequent growth, plunging from .913 in 1975:1 to .881 in 
1975:2, a .032 decline within a quarter. The sudden drop corresponded to 
the quarter in which the tax rebate was enac"ted. The economy steadily pro-
gressed thereafter, culminating in an APe of .935 in -"1977: 1. Estima-ed spending 
coefficients showed the direct effects of tax cuts on spending. The pattern 
of spending from the tax cuts during the 1975:2-1976 period corresponded to the 
erratic drop and subsequent rise in the APe. Spending coefficients indicated 
that a small proportion of the rebate was spent in 1976:2 ( 5.9 billion dollars ). 
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An even smaller portion of the extra income arising from the tax cut was used 
in the remainder of 1975, 4.3 billion dollars. However, by 1976:2, $6 . 7 billion 
-was spent and an average of $7.2 billion was consumer, thereafter. 
An interesting hypothetical test was initiated, whereby the estimated 
coefficients were applied. It was shown that over a two year horizon the 
1975-76 tax cut was 80% as effective as a permanent cut. Simple co~ectures 
were drawn from the result that a temporary cut is half as effective as a 
permanent cut over a four quarter period . Since $20 billion was lost during 
the five quarter tax cut/rebate package, a permanent tax cut about half as 
large, $9.5 billion would achieve the same results in affecting aggregate 
demand . 
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POLICY AIMS AND OUTLINES 
The three special taxes whi ch will be the focus of this study include 
the Kennedy Revenue Act 1964:March -1965:2; the Revenue Adjustment Act 
1975:2 - 1976:2, and the 1981:4 - present Economic Recovery Act. Using 
quarterly time-series data from 1963 : 4 - 1983:2, I will be working with 
a sample size of 79 data points . 
The Revenue Act prescribed during the Kennedy Administration was aimed 
at the demand side of the economy. Its purpose was to put productive capacity 
to work by raising private demand. The consumption gain is twofold : 
1 ) There is a direct result on personal disposable income 
2 ) Extra incomes arise from additions to consumer spending, 
a multiplier effect. 
In 1965, the economists did witness a buoyant state of demand . There 
were large increases in spending, particularly for defense • . Reasons for 
the change in economic climate were the rise in defense spendig and the 1964 
reduction in personal and corporate income taxes, according to the 1 966 
Sur vey of Current Business . 
The 1975 antirecession cuts were part of a twofold tax package . Beginning 
in 1 975, the Revenue Adjus tment Act increased the minimum standard deduction, 
increased the percent of standard deductions, and extended the 10% refundable 
earned i ncome credit program for families with dependents and incomes below 
$8,000 . The Tax Reform Act in 1976, merely extended the provisions of the 
Revenue Adjustment Act . I n the second quarter of 1975, a tax rebate program 
·was implemented 
Reagan's recent Economic Recovery Act (1 981 ) reduces the marginal tax 
r at e facing a median income family in 1984 from 28% to 22%. His incentive 
tax policy attempts to increase the after-tax returns for work, saving, and 
investment - raising the supply level of the economy. He focuses on a phased 
I ." 
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reduction schedule , in which individual tax rates are reduced in stages 
by 30 percent. This is the basic "10-10-10" tax cut. Compared with the 
former tax law, rates would be reduced by 5 percent for 1981,15 percent for 
1982, 25 percent for 1983 and 30 percent for 1984. The Reagan Economic 
Recovery Act (ERA ) began in 1981:4 and should last through 1984 . 
DURATION OF TAX POLICIES 
The tax cut of 1974 was designed to accelerate the growth of a sluggish 
economy. As a marginal tax cut policy, it was expected to be of an indefinite 
duration, and was legislated to be permanent . 
In 1975 . a massive tax cut was enacted. The one-shot rebate package was 
clearly temporary and the ensuing tax cuts were considered to be of a tem-
porary duration as well . 
The most recent tax cut, the ERA,was legislated to be permanent and will 
be ' on the books ' until it is repealed by a change in tax policy. 
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GENERAL THEORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF MODEL 
By formulating a model which measures the impact of a permanent vis a vis 
a temporary tax cut, I am in essence asking whether a tax cut at the moment 
it is announced to the public at large as a discretionary fiscal policy, 
is able to induce consumers to increase their expenditures. Such a model will 
be outlmea beginning from a bask Keynesian framework and methodically expanded 
i n order to incorporate t he Permanent Income Hypothesis , which differentiates 
transitory and permanent changes in income. 
My analysis will include various adaptations of the consumption function. 
I n each case, I will hope to summarize my results with an analysis of the 
theoretical implications of any changes I haVe made. 
Keynes ' General Theory contained what he called "a fundamental psy-
chological law." Very simply, we may state that as income increases , 
consumpti on also increases but by a smaller degree . 
C = f(y) O/~<l 
A corollary of this law concerns the long run and short run consumption 
habi·ts of the individual consumer. In · the short run, one 's standard of 
living is not as flexible as in the long run . Differences between actual 
i nc ome and 'usual' spending would be saved . Spending patterns are based on 
habit formation and thus , a consumer would require time to adapt to changes 
in income. 
The most basic linear model makes no short or long run stipulations: 
C = J... + /5Y + u. The income variable is personal disposable income, for a 
consumer has net income in mind when making consumption decisions . Be-
cause consumption is assumed to be independent of the price level , t he 
vari ables of the consumption function will be deflated by the GNP price 
i ndex and entered in real, not nominal terms . This process is also ne- ' 
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cessary to avoid overestimation of the correlation coefficients. 
Consumers' spending d~cisions will be affected by permanent, habitual, 
' normal' changes in their income. Friedman (1957) defines permanent income 
as an amount consumers believe they can consume given a set wealth level. 
Such income is often described as: planned, normal, expected, or permanent 
income . The difference between observed current income and permanent income 
is the transitory component, YT' 
It is assumed that a consumer wi l l derive his/her consumption schedule 
with only Yp in mind . The ratio of Cp/Yp is independent of Yp . Our basic 
consumption function is derived as follows, where consumption is a function 
of Permanent Personal Disposable Income, oP . 
Permanent income is a weighted 
average of past incomes. 
Multiply each side by d...... 
Subtract DPt from both sides . 
~ measures how quickly consumers adjust to changes in their current 
disposable income . The larger l, the more quickly consumers adjust . 
,;,here : V~ 
The derivation"af the model took place 
in discussions with Professor Fernandez . 
"V ~ estimating equation 
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When testing the outcome of a Federally legislated tax cut, one 
cannot. conveniently assume that taxes stay constant in years where tax 
laws have not been enacted, for taxes are not exogenous. There is a steady 
increase in tax levels corresponding to rises in income levels . 
Permanent Personal Income will be denoted, PI~ and Permanent Personal 
Disposable Income, DIP. Definitionally, disposable income is equivalent 
to personal income less tax and nontax payments. It may be helpful to 
comment at this pOint on ideally using tax rates , r, rather than aggregate 
tax levels in the estimating equation . The main problem in using aggre-
gates is the possibility of including effects into the model other than the 
specific marginal tax changes I am interested in capturing. Other effects 
would primarily be the result of a high degree of correlation between taxes 
and ci.!!l80me . 
According to the PIH , temporary tax changes will be • ignored ', \\hereas 
a permanent tax change should induca an additional spending effect • 
... 
where r P =L oCkrt _k .". oCrPt-l + r t temporary or no rate t 1(0 0 change . 
rtP = " ~ oC rPt _l + rt + B(rt-r t_l ) permanent 
To avoid non-linea r estimation, logs were applied . 
In Ct = a + b In Dt P + Ut 
In DtP = -rtP + In PItP 
In PItP =£ tZkln PIt_k = cL.ln PIt !?1 + In PIt 
rate change . 
In Ct -,,[In Ct_l::: a(I-.,() + b(ln DtP - oCln Dt_lPJ + Vt 
"In Ct ::: C. + .:Un Ct-l + b (-rt
P + .{.rP~-1 + In PItP - In<tPIP t-l + Vt ) 
~Note that: -rt = -rtP + ~Pt-l no permanent tax change 
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In order to distinguish permanent t .ax changes from transitory cuts 
and from 'no change ' a qualj_tative dummy variable is created; 
DUM = 0 years when there is not tax cut, or the tax cut is temporary . 
DUM= 1 years when the tax cut is permanent. 
I . In Ct = c + ~n Ct _l + b In (P1t-rt) - (B(rt-rt_l)}DUMt + Vt 
In Ct = c + c;(ln Ct - l + b In Dlt - . ,(B(rt - rt-l ) ]DU~ + Vt 
At its very extreme , as B approaches 1.0 , consumers would treat the tax 
cut as a permanent change in income. An announcement alone would induce 
consumers to change their spending patterns . .If B approached zero, con-
sumers' spending patterns would be unaffected by the tax cut. 
The specified equation has its theoretical basis in a model by 
Brown (1952). His major premise was that consumption is a function of 
continuous past influences: Ct = ~ + BIYt + B2Ct_l 
This construction of the consumption equation obeys the Keynesian require-
ment that short run MPC is less than long run MPC, where long run MPC, 
MPCLR = Bl/(l - B2). Theoretically, by introducing a lagged dependent vari-
able, one puts in an infinite distributed lag in income with geometrically 
declining weights (Pindyck 1981). 
00 
Ct = c(/I-B2 + Bl;ZB2jYt_' . - . J:O J 
The consumption - disposable income relationship has appeared in all sizes, 
degrees of disaggregation, and variations on the Keynesian law. The presence 
of lagged consumption, however, introduces a cumulative influence of the 
whole history of consumption and of income on current ~onsurnption. Habit 
persistence, or what Heller calls "inertia in living standards" is implied 
by the lagged consumption variable (1968). 
Heller ran regression estimates for the period 1954 :1 - 1964:4 
Ct = -1.40 + .371 Yt + .609 Ct - l • 
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One of the most important assumptions of the PIH is that transitory 
components of income and of consumption are uncorrelated: cov (cT' y"i') = 0, 
for it is this assumption which is the basis for the hypothesis that a 
windfall gain will be saved, and a positive YT value will not lead to a 
deviation from one's consumpti on plan. 
Statistically speakfugthe independence of the two transitory effects 
can not be guaranteed. The effect of the correlation between stastically 
recorded transitory components of income and consumption is greatly de-
pendent on how the . data was obtained. Ideally, income and consumption should 
be measured independently. Onl y then might we expect the errors of the 
estimate to be independent. Friedman (1957) cautions the researcher that 
the consumption variable should not be estimated by substracting savings 
from income. 
For the purpose of consumption-inc~me analysis, consumption (per-
sonal consumer expenditures) data was taken from the U.S. Department of 
Commerce, BEA. The components of this series include the market value of 
goods and services purchased by individuals and nonprofit institutions, 
the financial services received in kind by individuals,and the estimated 
rental value of owner-occupied homes (home purchases are not included). 
The personal consumer expenditures are estimated as final demand components 
of the . input-output table during bench-mark years •. Estimates for quarterly 
consumer spending are derived from trends shown by the Census Bureau's 
retail sales figures according to kind of store, quantity series, and price 
information. Data from the Census monthly selected services receipts is 
used to derive quarterly estimates of services. 
Personal income measures income received by persons and includes go-
vernment transfers . It is the composite of wage and salary disbursements , 
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other labor income, proprietors ' income , rental income of persons , dividends , 
personal interes-t income, and transfer payments less personal contributions 
for social insurance. - Personal income less tax a-nd nontax payments yields 
disposable income, where taxes are comprised of: income taxes, prelperty taxes , 
estate and gift taxes, and motor vehicle licenses . Nontax includes passport 
fees, fines, donations, penalties, and tuition and hospital fees paid to 
public schools and hospitals (BEA, May 1977) . 
Empirical Work 
In order to establish a basic groundwork, I ran a series of regressions 
of consUmption on disposable income using quarterly data: 1964:1-198~:2 • 
a . Ct= -19.2351 + . 9287DIt+ ~ where Ct = consumer expenditures 
( 6.08) ( . 01) 
R2 = . 9956 
D-W = .7101 
Secondly, a regression was run based on Brown ' s model : 
My results were as follows without having adj usted for mul ticollinearity : 
b. Ct = 1.0550 + . 1963DIt + . 7886Ct _l + Ut 
( 4.45) (.07) (.08) 
R2 = . 9981 
D-W = 1.35 
A past estimate of-this function by Hendry (1973 ) using quarterly data 
1957: 1 - 1967:2 yielded fairly similar !:esults : 
Ct = 0 . 130Dlt + O.777Ct_l + seasonals. 
(.068) (.099) 
Brown ' S consumption function for non-durables and se~vices has been esti-
mated in the context of a n eight-equation macro-model by two stage least 
squares. The equation was estimated with quarterly dummy yariables to ad-
just for a seasonally shifting intercept term._ At this point it is necessary 
to point out that for the purposes of the study , I am interested in capturing 
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the spending response to a tax policy announcement by modeling a basic 
consumption function which is consistent with the PIH. Perfecting the 
estimation of the fun~ion itself , using a fully specified macro-model , is 
not the intent of this study. 
A brief interpretation of the results of t he first two regressions 
will provide a foundation for our complete consumption-tax change model . 
First, our model '""a".is the simplest form of the consumption function . The 
coefficient of the disposable income variable, the MPC, was estimated to be 
. 93. In this stringently specified equation, any omitted variables, posi-
tively correlated with disposable income , tend to push the parameter 
estimate higher than the true value. 
Model "b" included lagged consumption as an explanatory variable . 
This term allows for current consumption to be closely dependent upon its 
own recent behavior as well as on income. Thus, the coefficient of dis-
posable income must be interpreted differently for this model. The DI 
estimate in this model is clearly not a measure of the MPC out of income, 
but is a :~easure of the change in consumption associated with a one unit 
change in disposable income, assuming "that consumption in the previous 
period remained . unchanged (pindyck/Rubinfeld 1981)." More importantly, 
the main distinction of model "b" , is that the total effect of a change 
in disposable income on consumption will take place over time and can be 
measured only by calculating the long-run MPC, assuming that consumption 
patterns are equal over time. Solving for Ct = Ct - l , the MPCLR = Bl/ (1-B2 )' 
In the estimated equation : MPCLR = .1963/(1-.78~6) = .9286. 
As a first procedure in estimating the derived equation, " I", aggre-
gate .tax and non-tax payments in terms of levels were applied . Using this 
variable runs the risk of misspecification, for it must be assumed that 
Federal taxes have undergone changes which can be separated from state 
/ 
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and local tax reforms. State and local taxes as well as nontax payments 
are assumed to have remained fairly constant. There is the possibility that 
the regression estimates will capture the effects of such significant 
state tax changes as the California proposition #13 on top of the effects 
of specific Federally legislated tax cuts. 
In this procedure, because tax levels rather than tax rates will 
be applied, it will be unnecessary to take log values: 
For purposes of simplification, Personal Income less Tax and non-tax payments 
equals Disposable IncoJ.TIe. In estimating the .equation, dummy one values 
proxied for quarters in which a tax cut was in legislation . 
1964:1-1965:4 - Kennedy Tax Reform Program 
1981 : 4-1983: 2 - Reagan' s Economic Recovery Act. 
1. Ct = .3186 + . 9278Ct _ l + . 0721 (PIt-Tt) + ~8045(Tt':"Tt_l ) Dt + Vt . 
(5.65) ( .05) (. 05) (.50) 
Before correcting for auto correlation errors, the OLS parameter estir(lates 
were considered. It is fairly evident that the lagged consumption variable 
and the disposable income variable are sensitive to multicollinearity, 
because of a relatively high degl;"ee of covariance between the estimated 
parameters . The former is overestimated and the latter is underestimated 
in terms of the true parameter. 
Brown' s basic model is ideal for the purposes of this study for it 
accords with the PIH, where consumers are expected to adjust their spending 
patterns over time: cP = f(Y P ). The model allows for cmntinuouspartial 
adjustment of consump~ion habits . By adjusting the Brown specification 
in order to include the effects of changing tax rates on consumer·spending, 
the regression estimates are still consistent with previous estimates of 
the MPC. 
Deflated disposable income replaced deflated personal income less 
, 
:" .. --... 
tax and nontax payments in a second estimation : 
2 . C = t . 56 + 
( 5 . 77) 
~ 92 Ct _l + 
( . 05) 
.080It + 
( . 05) 
.07(Tt-Tt_I)Ot + Vt • 
(.16 ) 
All coefficients ... ,ere significant at the 5% l evel, given a one tailed 
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test. The regression results are close to expected values. Both the lagged 
consumption variable and the disposable income variable closely correspond 
to regressions run by Brown et al. The R2 = .9980, o-w = L 5142 indicating 
a good fit at the expense of serious multicollinearity and serial correlation . 
The fact that estimates using the original (PIt-Tt ) variable and the tax 
cut variable are highly correlated is evident by the substantial reduction 
in the upward bias of the tax cut parameter when the OIt variable was sub-
stituted. The regres sions have. " _be~m ineffective in capturing the effect 
of a tax rate change on consumption. By using tax levels, the only lesson 
which can be drawn is that increments in the dollar amounts of tax and nontax 
p3yITlents rose wit h consumer spending DBecause taxes are a component of 
disposable income , the tax variable is taking on some of the impact of 
01 on consumption . The ~eve1' regression estimates, however, were able to 
provide me with a sense cif the size of the short run and long run MPC, 
Before testing the efficacy of including additional explanatory ' variables 
in the estimating equation I will comment on the pure consumption dependent 
variable and the consumer expenditures variable. The MPCs which have been 
estimated include investment spending on durab1es , and thus may overstate the 
so called 'pure' consumption effect. Separate regressions were run using 
ser vices and non-durable goods expenditures as the dependent variable . The 
results are summarized below: 
I ) Ct = 14.7478 + .75590It + Ut 
(5.97) ( .01) 
"II ) Ct = 5.2147 + . 0446 OIt + .9419Ct _l + ut 
(2.03 ) ( .03 ) ( .04) 
III ) Ct '" 4.9342 + • 0435 DI t + . 9437 Ct-l + . 2909 (Tt-Tt-l)DUMt + Ut 
(2 . 04 ) ( .03 ) ( .04 ) ( .24) 
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We may compare the ~WC estimated from using a 'pure ' consumption de-
pendent variable and a consumer expenditure dependent variable. Our expen-
diture regression yielded a high ~Cl.r. of . 9286. Filtered estimates of 
consumption which defines durables to be a component of savings, yields 
a ~Cl.r. of .1676. This results comes close to estimates by Friedman and 
other economists who were testing the pure PIH. Davis(1952) used constant 
annual data for the period, 1929-1940 and estimated MPC to equal . 7886. 
Simultaneous equation bias results when OLS is applied to our struc-
tural equation. This is mainly due to variables, N~~ely disposable income 
and taxes, which are not exogenous. DI is jointly determined in the equation 
system and is thus related to the error term in the consumption function . 
Corrections for simultaneous equation bias using instrumental variables 
yi~lds a slightly lower ~C of .68 • . The long run ~C seems more reasonable. 
The addition of a lagged consumptiGn variable, less durables predicts 
a ~C value of . 8021 in the long run. MPCl.r . = .0446/(1-.9419). Although 
we observe estimates which may be biased, we can consistently conclude that 
our consumption function obeys the Keynesian l aw that the short-run MPC, 
Bl , is less than the long-run MPC, Bl/ (l-B2 ) • 
My next procedure was to attempt to improve upon the fundamental con-
sumption function. Wealth is a possible determinant in Keynes' original 
specification. By including a wealth variable, we are incorporating a real 
balance effect . Its role is to counterbalance changing income streams over 
time. Imbalances in a consumer ' s asset position is allowed to affect her 
consumption behavior. 
The dependence of consumption on two components of disposable income: 
transfer payments and all other disposable income will be identified. 
Changes in the level of income as in our original model will affect con-
sumption slowly, so the dependence occurs through a geometric lag. The 
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Ct value will also impose a geometric lag on wealth. Because we expect 
the increases or decreases in wealth to affect Ct , we use the change in the 
wealth levels as an estimating variable. The reason for separating the DI 
variable into two components is to stabilize the estimating equation. Accor-
ding to Wallis, an equation results in an instability when there ' is a heavy 
dependence on disposable income. Dividing the variable into two ccmponents 
reduces this instability. 
Using total consumer spending asa dependent variable produced the fol10wing 
results, where DI was disaggregat ed into transfers, TR, and non-transfers . 
T-statistics are in parenthesis: 
Ct = 25 . 1872 + . 3207TRt+ .1248(DI-TR)t+ . 8658(Tt-Tt_l)DUHt+ ~8062Ct_l + Vt 
(2.042) ( 3.640 ) (1.583 ) (1.849) (10.613) 
R2 = . 9983 
D-W = 1.3773 
We would expect the MPC for transfers to be lower than the MPC for 
othe r income because lower inccrne households tend to consume out of trans-
fers. Over a cross section of the population, the average and marginal 
propensities to consume fall as income rises. This is a well-accepted 
corollary to Keyne s' fundamental law: the proportion of income consumer de-
cre ases as income increases . As the regression estimates indicate, the 
MPC out of transfer payments is indeed as tbeory suggests, where: b2 ~ bl 
The inclusion of the change in household wealth variable yielded dis-
appointing results. Data was obtained from the Floor of Funds Division -
The Federal Reserve Board. 
Ct = 9 . 0552 + . 8339 Ct _ l + .2650 TR + .1380 (DIt-TRt ) + • 9750 (Tt';"'ft-l ) 
(. 738) (11.746) (3.181) (1.883) (2.236) 
R2 = . 9984 
D-W == 1. 2849 
+ .00624WLTH + Vt . 
( . 806 ) 
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Although the wealth variable itself leads to a higher R2, we are unable 
to accept this variable as having any significant explanatory power. 
Comparable · results with or without the Asset variable indicated that 
" WLTH'''~ could not improve the estimating equation. 
Disposable Income was further disaggregated in.order to test the 
independent effects of property income, transfers, and all other income. 
Separating for wage income would not be beneficial for the interest of 
this study, for consumers are usually unable to seaparate windfall gains or 
withholding reductions from other increases in their salary. 
An experimental variable "consumer sentiment" was included to 
measure the consumer's expectation effect. For instance a high consumer 
sentiment index value corresponds to quarters in which a permanent tax cut 
was implemented, indicating that consumers should have faith in the permanence 
of the tax cut. As a result, they would be more likely to consume out of 
~,eir disposable income. The causality could also be reversed. An announeed 
tax cut, itself could boost consumer confidence and their perception of the 
health of the economy . Indeed, this was true of the 1964 Kennedy Tax Cut. 
The C.S. Index was at its peak through the years 1964-1966. The index was 
low through the early eighties, only having jumped within the first three 
quarters of 1983 frow a level of 75.3 to 91 . 6 • 
Ct = -20.0821 + . 7654Ct _l + .31l7TRt + . 300lPRt + .1909~OTHERT+ 1.2172 CUTt + Vt 
(-1.321 ) (14 . 06) (4 . 29) (4.25) (2.96 ) (3.05) 
R2 = . 9988 
D-W = 1.7878 
All statistics are significant at the 5% level . The coefficients for transfers 
and property income 'seem' reasonable . Further disaggregation of disposable 
income introduced serious problems of multicollinearity. Because there is a 
positive correlation between different income variables, OLS cannot sort out 
the independent effects of a particular type of income . There is little ex-
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planatory value left in each coefficient and the system collapses . Thus , 
although the standard errors of the estimators are low, the value of the 
parameters may not have an interpretable value . 
The tax cut coefficient was biased upward due to collinearity with 
elements of property income. The tax level variable was again unable to 
proxy for the announcement effect on consumer spending. We can only observe 
that taxes roseconcomit·antly with consumption from quarter to quarter. 
The addition of a proxy for consumer sentiment yields an estimating 
equation which has a more random distribution of the error term. Serial 
correlation is substantially reduced. 
Ct - - 46 . 5275 + . 8127 Ct-l + . 2 968 TRt + .1339 PRt + .1793 O'rHERt 
( -2 . 916 ) (1 5.562) (4.399) (1 . 661) (2.988 ) 
+ .7993 CUTt + .3190 CSt + Vt. 
(2 . 055 ) (3.541 ) 
2 R = .999 
D-W = 2 .100 
It has been noted that the results from t he ' level ' · regressions com-
bined both automatic stabilization effects, as well as the effects of 
discretionary fiscal policy changes . We now must attempt to separate a 
tax cut effect from other income disturbances . 
T = fer * DI) 
AT = or .. DI ..... Ai)l * r 
If the income effect of taxation overwhelms the tax rate effect, the 
result of a tax cut policy on consumer spending will be masked. 
A separate t est .was deve loped to help capture the result of an 
announced permanent tax cut. Earlier, we observed from the model of 
Consumption regressed on lagged cons umption, disposable income, and the 
change in tax levels from the preceding period, that taxes and consumption 
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rise together even in those quarters where a permanent tax change was enacted . 
Thus ~ it seems that a positive $1 increment in tax levels leads t o nearly a 
$1 increase in consumer spending. Moreover, because disposable income is 
included as an explanatory variable, tax levels are already built into the 
model. It is difficult to capture the separate effects of a tax cut. 
As a result of our findings, our question at this point is whether a 
tax cut has an effect on consumption, independent of its effect through 
disposable income. According to the PIH, it should not, for income changes 
affect permanent income, which in turn, through a lagged effect feeds into 
consumption. 
Very simply, we may t est the assumption t hat the slope parameter of 
the consumption function has changed in periods when a tax cut is announced. 
I n other words , we should test whether an announced tax policy can bring 
about a change in the aggregate MPC. A test of whether this change is sig-
nificant is given by testing the null hypothesis that the coefficient, 
DDMtDlt = O. 
Least-squares estimation should yield unique estimates of the standard 
errors and of the distributions of the estimated parameters. As in Fried-
man's PIB model, the variance of the error term is assumed to be the same 
in periods when eith~a temporary tax cut or no cut has been announced 
in contrast to those periods in which a permanent tax cut is announced. 
Quarters tested were : 1964:1-1965:4, 1981:4 
Ct = -31.23 + . 94Dlt - .06 DUMtDlt + 44 . 36DUMt +ut 
(4.402 ) (116.38) (-2.576) ( 2.8~,Z) 
R2 = . 9961 
The pure announcement effect of a permanent tax cut; 1964:1 and 1981:4 was 
tested as well : Ct = -22.43 + .93 DI t - .06DUMtDIt + 44.96 DUMt + Ut ( -3.650) (129.7) (-2.021) (1.930) 
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We can conclude the following about whether consumption behavior differs 
as a result of announced reductions in taxation. A test of whether an 
announcement of a permanent ~cut will induce a change in the aggregate 
MPC is provided by testing the null hypothesis that the coefficient DtDIt 
equals zero. We accept the null hypothesis in this case. The conclusion 
we reach is consistent with economic theory. Namely, a tax cut gain will 
not show up as a deviation in the consumers' long-run consumption plans, 
An announcement of a permanent tax cut may have the effect of shifting the 
consumption function, as any increase in permanent income would, but it should 
have no effect on altering the slope of the function. In other words, 
the announcement did seem to correspond with a higher consumption level than 
in those years when a well-publicised tax change was not legislated: the 
intercept of the consumption function changed in permanent tax cut quarters . 
This change was significant given the highly significant Dummy variable 
estimate. 
We may conclude thct: in those two quarters when a permanent tax cut was 
announced, the differences in MPC were slight. The dummy-DI coefficient 
is .06 at the 5% level of significance. The same regression was run on the 
two quarters: 1964:2-1981:4. Insignificant t-ratios led me to conclude that 
the time of announcement is crucial. Consumers were perhaps already well-
aware of the tax change prior to t.tar·ch of 1964 , when the change \-las imple-
mented. The announcement took place throughout the early months of 1 964 . 
By 1 964:2, the announcement effect had a less profound effect. 
On the other hand, Reagan's tax reform was 'announced' relatively 
early in 1981, but was not wholly implemented until the last quarter of 1 981-
The 1981 individual income taxes had in fact increased 14.6% from the pre-
vious year. By 1982 , the rate of increase had been reduced to 3 . 96% from 
the preceding year . 
.' 
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A l agged consumption variable is formulated into the equation: 
Bl t ests the long run effect of lagged consumption on consumption this quarte~ 
We should expect B2 to be close to zero, whereas Bl, the long run MPC with 
no tax change, should be around .8 . What we in fact find is that Bl equals 
.71 , B2 = .22 and DI = . 2 • . The remaining variables were statistically in-
significant . Since Bl equals long runMPC, whereas B2 equals the effect of 
a permanent tax cut on long run MPC , the sum of Bl + B2 yields the total 
MPC 1 • r. !;: • 93 • 
We are now ready to test the initial estimating equation: "I" , by 
applying tax rates. For the 1964 and 1981 permanent tax cut periods, the 
major part of the tax cut program was in reducing the withholding rate. 
Legislators of these two cuts were primarily interested in cutting taxes 
"on the margin" . 
The approximations for the tax rates : r = T / NI, where total tax 
collections is divided by national income . Returning to our earlier esti-
mating equation: 
Using tax rates within the estimating equation did not lead to significant 
results upon first estimation. The tax cut parameter waS small and insig-
nificant. More in~eresting was the negative sign of the tax cut estimator. 
As expected, a d ecline in tax rates from the preceding quarter will lead to an 
increase in consumer spending . Two-stage least squares was then applied to 
correct for nMiL!::8dlinearit:y. 1964:1-1965:4 and 1981 : 4-1983:2 respresented 
the quarters in which a permanent tax cut was enacted-. Prior to adjusting 
for multicollinearity, the estimating equation was as follows: 
In C t = .01 + . 78 In Ct - l + .21 In DIt - .27ARATEtDUMt + V t' 
(.289 ) (10. 35 ) ( 2 . 72) (-.42) 
R2 = . 9984 D-W = 1.4312 
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The Instrumental variables used in re-estimating the equation were : the constant, 
deflated Gross Private Domestic Investment, deflated Government Expenditure , 
lagged disposable income, and the dummy variable: 
In Ct = .03 + .91 I n Ct-l + .08 In Dlt - 4.94 ARATEtDUMt + Vt • 
(.126) (1.360) (1.119) (-1.067) 
D-W = 1. 9629 
A plot of the variance-covariance matrix revealed a random distribution of 
the error terms. Omitted variable misspecification, hO\vever, has induced an 
overestimation of the parameter coefficients . This is true of the tax cut 
variable. Although this variable and the lagged consumption variable were 
both acceptable at the 10% significance level, given a one-tailed test , the 
tax cut parameter deserves scrutiny. 
Because, we are tes ting the change in tax rates , firs -t differencing 
from preceding quarters, the greater than one coefficient could reflect 
accumulatory effects from consumer expectations from past ~jods . The crucial 
outcome of the equation is the direction . A reduction in the tax rate will 
lead · to an increase in consumer spending. The value of the estimator itself 
is not meaningful due to misspecification . 
Although the variable proxying individual tax payments did not ex-
h ibit variability from quarter to quarter, due to non-tax payments, I per-
formed the same regression as in my former model using yearly individual 
Federal income tax payments. In this manner I could draw out the spec ific 
federal tax changes, rather than measure both federal- 'announced' tax changes 
as vlell as state and local tax changes. The parameter results were not as 
easily interpreted as my quarterly time-series results. This maybe due to 
the substantially reduced degrees of freedom. It wasrnore difficult to 
accept the tax cut parameter estimates at the 1 0% confidence level . 
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Examining the yearly Individual Income Tax data itself is beneficial in 
identifying the changes in tax levels feom year to year. The lowest po-
sitive increment occurred in the 1964-5 tax cut years . Total individual 
tax collections in current dollars was increased by .1 billion. The 1968 
surtax raised the level of tax collections up by 18.5 billion in the years 
1967- 8. Tax collections were actually reduced in 1971 by 4.2 billion from 
the previous year . The 1975 rebate and tax cut program witnessed only a 
3.46 increment in tax collection from the preceding year. Tax collection 
growth was greatest in 1981 when taxes increased 41.8 billion, a 15% growth 
rate. By 1982, under Reagan's Tax Reform Act, tax rates had dropped to a 4% 
growth rate from the previous year . 
The 1964 tax cut corresponded to a 13% growth in consumer spending from 
1964 to 1966., and a 14% growth rate in personal disposable income within 
these two years . This may be compared to the 1976-76 tax cut program, which 
corresponded to a 10% growth in consumer spending and an 8% growth in dispo-
sable income . 
Where 1981, 1975, 1970 and 1965 are proxied as tax cut years: 
= .03 + . 07 in Ct _ 1 + . 76 In DIt + .99 CUT.t + Vt 
(.42 ) (1.63) ( 5.28) (1.36) 
.998. 
1.14 
When temporary tax-cuts were combined with Permanent cuts the estimator 
has a positive correlation with consumer spending. A differenT story 
emerged when results were run using the two permanent tax cut yea~s, 1964 
and 1981. The sign 'of the tax cut estimator became negative, indicating 
that in those two years, a reduction in tax rates induced an increase in 
consumer spending. Without further corrections for multicollinearity , 
the results were not acceptable at the 10% significance level : 
Ct = .03 + .29 In Ct _ l + .70 In DIt - .5lCUTt + Vt 
(.39) (1.87) (4.47) (-1 . 32) 
R2 = .998 
D-W = 1. 20 
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Instrumental variable estimation was able to give more robustesti-
mates . The lagged consumption parameter, for example, was equal to . 85, 
a much more plausible estimat2than the unadjusted estimate of .29 • 
Ct = . 19 + . 85 In Ct _l + .12 In DIt - 1.41 CUTt + Vt ' 
(1. 42 ) ( 2 . 19) (1 .31) (-1.43) 
R2 = .9962 
D-W = 1.45 
Our tax cut parameter should really be measuring changes, not from the 
preceding quarter, but in relation to the quarter immeidiately prior to 
the tax change. Our permanent tax cut: B(rt - rt_l)DUMt should be specified: 
B{rt - r*)DUMt
, where r* is proxied by the maximum tax rate up to the pre-
sent period. For example in 1965:3 we should expect B to measure the diffe-
rence in tax rates from 1963:4-1965:3 . Tax rates peaked a few quarters before 
the Kennedy program was implemented. 
As a test, I have cut t he extent of the 1964 Kennedy Revenue Act to four 
quarters , beginning in the f irst quarter of 1964 ( in March) the program 
effectively lasted through the fir st half of 1965 . However, the tax reduc-
tion scheme took a downturn at the close of 1964, and it is accurate to say 
that the tax reform program had substantial reductions in 1965. Heller found 
that during the first half of 1965, the administration had to allow for 
reduced refunds and large ' clean-up payments ' on the 1964 liabilities , 
reducing the magnitUde of the tax cut (1968) . 
Thus, the measurement for the tax cut parameter could be specified 
as (Tt-T*)DUMt where T* = 60.9 billion in the quarter preceding the 1964 
tax reform program. Unfortunately, regressions run for a ten year period 
from 1964-1974 showed i nsignificant results in testing the difference between 
quarter "x" and the quarter immediately preceding the tax cut. Consumers 
vie'" tax cuts as a marginal, incremental process. They may be unable to 
distinguish year to year tax changes, let alone compare this quarter ' stax 
change to a change in tax rates a couple years earlier . 
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Not surprisingly, the most sucessful way in which to capture the tax 
cut's impact on consumer spending does take into account that consumers do 
not respond to a tax cut immediately, or in the very same quarter the tax 
cut is implemented. Such a view would be unrealistic. Pechman (1977, p. 20) 
when describing a consumer's response to temporary income tax changes, notes 
that " most economists believe that a temporary income tax change would have 
some effect on consumer spending, although they agree that it would be less 
powerful than a permanent tax change." "Income tax changes," he emphasizes, 
"also operate with a lag, because consumers do not alter their spending imme-
diately in response to changes in disposable income ." 
Rather than first differencing the rate of tax change, comparing the 
present quarters' tax rates with last quarters ' rate.s, the tax rate corres-
ponding to year t , should be specified as: RATEt_l - RATEt _2. Consumers 
this period react to last period's change in tax rates. An announcement will 
not induce consumers to spend out of any increased incomes until at least two 
quarters after the tax cut has been realized by the public . 
Regressions will continue to be run using the BEA's "tax and nontax 
payments" data, instead of data which separates government revenue collections 
into a component, "Individual Income Taxes". The BEA quarterly data is reliabl!e 
and consistent. Furthermore, we may be assured that non-tax payments comprises 
less than 2% of the Personal Tax and Non-tax payments data points. A series of 
calculations indicated that there is little variance in this component from 
quarter to quarter. 
Tests of the permanent tax change periods 1964:1 - 1965 : 4 and 1981:4-
1982:2 were run. The tax cut variable was specified as follows: 
RATE = TAX PAYMENTS/NATIONAL INCOME (NI) 
CUTt = RATEt_l - RATEt _2 
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A comparison of the regressions results using tax cut proxies measures 
as: a } RATE - RATEt _ l 
and b) RATE t _ l - RATEt_2 is given below: 
a) In Ct = .008 + .781 In Ct _ l + .216 In DIt _ l - .480 CUTt + Vt R2 = .9984 
(.201) (l0.313) (2.772 ) (-.809) 
D-W = 1.4642 
b) In Ct = . 004 + .782 In Ct _ l + .215 In Dlt 1.290 CUTt + Vt R2 = .9985 
(.103 ) (10.650) (2.847) (-2.241) D-W = 1.3810 
The highly significant tax cut coefficient of 1.29 leads us to confirm that 
a permanent tax cut announcement has a negative effect on a cansurner'scal-
culation of his/her permanent disposable income. A decline in the tax rate 
induces consumers to spend . For each 1.0 standard deviation reduction in 
the tax rate, there is a corresponding 1.29 standard deviation increase in 
consumption. The reason for the greater than one coefficient could be due 
to the following reasons: 1) accumulatory expectation effects which arise 
from consumers'responding after a -' lag, 2) serial correlation of the first order 
may be present, affecting the efficiency of the estimator, 3) specification 
error due to an omitted variable, which is positively correlated and thus 
upwardly biases the tax cut estimator. 
Consumers do not ignore the legislated cuts. We can reject the null 
hypothesi's B = 0 with confidence. A permanent tax cut is treated , just as 
any other change in one's permanent income would be treated by consumers. 
In order to take consumer's expectations into account, an index for consumer 
sentiment is included into the estimating equation. The Index is collated by 
the University of M,ichigan' s, Survey Research Center ,~nd is based on quar-
terly personal and telephone interviews. The sample size of 1,200 - 2,000 
respondents is selected by multi-stage area probability sampling methods. 
The respondent is asked five questions based on cemparing his personal finan-
cial status today with his status a year ago, speculating on _his financial 
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status a year from today, and five years from today; and on consumers ' 
opinions of whether it is a good or a bad time to buy major household items . 
A formula is then applied which subtracts a proportion of down or negative 
responses with a proportion of up or positive responses. These answers are 
then averaged and converted into an index (Handbook of Cyclical Indicators , 
p. 31) . 
After the inclusion of the CS variable there was a noticable reduction 
in serial correlation. A plot of the regression showed a random distri-
bution of the error terms, 
In Ct = -.261 + . 735 In Ct-l + .294 In DI t - . 870 CUTt + ~OOI CSt + Vt • 
(-5.765 ) (13 . 187) (5.065) (-1 . 985 ) (7.556) 
R2 = . 9992 D-W = 2 . 0569 
As my next procedure, disposable income is disaggregated into transfers 
and nontransfer income: 
In Ct = .233 + . 868 In Ct _ l + .069 In (DIt-TRt ) + .027 In TRt - 1.316CUTt + Vt 
(1. 805 ) ( 12.497) (1.074) (2.449) (-2.233 ) 
H2 = , 9985 D-W = .15028 
The final estimating equation is specified to include 'Consumer Sentiment'. 
In Ct = .001 + .807 In Ct_l + . 160 In(DIt-TRt) + . 0401n TRt - . 926 CUTt 
(.005) (15.294 ) (2.827) (4.653) (-2.079) 
R2 = . 9992 
D-W = 2.1517 
+.001 CSt + Vt 
(7.588) 
In this final equation, all estimates are significant at the 5% significance 
level . The highly significant permanent tax cut coefficient comes very close 
to -1 0 0, the full effect, whereby consumers integrate a tax cut into their 
spending decisions as they would any other change in their permanent income . 
Our tax proxy (RATEt_l - RATEt _2> indicates that the tax cut was able to 
induce consumers to spend, only a couple quarters after the tax cut was im-
plemented. We may say that there is a short lag between the time a cut is 
implemented, and the quarter i n which consumers respond to the tax cut . 
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The purists of the PIH, consider durables to be part of savings and 
investment c Thus, if a conSumer spends a portion of his tax cut dollars 
on consumer durables, that component is not considered to be part of pure 
consumption, Ct":* 
It is not surprising that filtering the dependent variable of durables 
reduces the size of the coefficient estimates, particularly the tax cut 
variable. Out of the original estimator, -.90 , the proportion spent on 
services and nondurables declines to a value of -.69. 
In Ct * = .-.081 + .938 In C*t-l + .069 In DIt - .692 CUTt + .001 CSt + Vt . (-3 . 029 ) (30.329) (2.288) (-2 . 393)(6.130) 
R2 = . 9996 D-I'17 = 1. 7376 
Disaggregating Disposable Income: 
In Ct* = .026 + .957 In C*t_l + . 026 In (DIt-TRt ) + .013 In TRt 
(.42 ) ( 34 . 956 ) (. 945 ) (2.485) 
R2 = . 9996 
D-W = 1.8184 - . 682 CUTt + . 001 CSt 
(-2.354) (6.258) 
We may conclude, given the pure PIH, that consumers were not completely 
responsive to an announced permanent tax cut. Definitionally consumers may 
not have been convinced that the tax would last, thus spending part of the 
income on "durables" which is considered to be a temporary or windfall spen-
ding effect. 
Whether a temporary tax cut is as effective needs to be addressed . 
We need to test whether all tax cuts, regardless of their temporal nature, 
significantly affect consumer spending. The PIH on wlich the estimating 
equation is derived would stipulate that "temporary income tax changes should 
have little impact on consumer spending in principle (Blinder, 1981, p. 27) ." 
Friedman's PIH (1957) establishes that a) transitory components have zero 
means b) the covariances between permanent and temporary components are zero, 
and c) the transitory components of income and consumption are uncorrelated 
with each other . From these assumptions we should expect that a windfall 
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gain will be saved (not ' spenton non-durable goods). In other words, given 
E(CT,YT ) = 0, a positive temporary income value should not lead to any de-
viation from one's consumption pattern. 
There have been four major, well-publiciSed tax changes during the years 
1960s- 1980s. The 1964 and 1981 cuts' ih marginal tax rates were publically 
announced as permanent. The 1968 income tax surcharge was introduced in the 
third quarter and was clearly temporary in nature. A rebate and massive 
tax cut were enacted in the second quarter of 1975. The rebate was clearly 





Dummy variables were used 
to correspond to all tax cut 
quarters. 
The resultant regressions estimates reveal interesting outcomes, 
which are nevertheless consistent with the PIH framework. By combining 
both temporary and permanent tax changes, I find that the results of consumer 
spending to tax cuts as a whole, are insignificant. A tax cut 'temporary' 
in nature does not alter cOnsumer spending patterns . 
Regressions which included these temporary tax cuts failed to give 
significant t'statistics. Moreover, the coefficients dropped to ~.10. 
Then the temporary tax cuts alone, were tested, there was even less of a 
consumption response. Any tax cut induced response was either absorbed in 
savings as the PIH predicts, or was spent more .than a year after the legis-











Note that the inclusion of temporary 'tax cut ' yields a greatly reduced 
tax cut coefficient . Although the result is not highly significant, we 
can hazard a guess that in those quarters , a tax cut was wholly ignored . 
The effect of income rising concomitantly with tax changes overpowered the 
induced censumer spending effect. 
The 1975 temporary tax cut coincided with the PIH model which states 
that a temporary or transitory change in income will have its main impact 
on saving and investment type assets, and not on consumption. A temporary 
tax cut will not increase permanent expected income. Consumption should 
proceed in the same path as if there had not been a tax change. We find 
that the 1975 tax cut actually induced savings. The data confirms this. 
In 1968, saving fell from 7.5% in the quarter immeidiately preceding the 
1968:2 surcharge to 5.6%. Consumers spent despite .the surcharge. By 1975:2 
when a tax cut was implemented, the savings rate shot up from 6.4% to 9.7% 
in 1975:2. It is evident that the tax cut induced savings rather than 
consumption. Blinder's study of the 1975 tax cut confirms the latent nature 
of the spending effect. When the direct effects of the tax cut on consumer 
spending were estimated, he found that most of the spending out of the tax 
cut were done in 1976 and 1977 . The greatest spending effect occurring in 
the last two quarters of 1977. Moreover, it is glaringly evident hGW small 
the tax cut impacts were relative to the size of the economy they were meant 
to stimultate (Blinder, 1981:46 ). 
Theoretically, consumption is not affected by transitory changes in 
income, yet, it is possible that unexpected windfalls could be used in spending , 
by inducing sOmeone to splurge, or what Friedman call_s, "riotous living" . 
A definition of consumption in terms of purchases in durables as well as non-
durables is making allowances in the theoretica l definition of consumption. 
Even when a broader definition of consumption to include durables .was ~pplied 
the transitory tax cuts tested were insignificant in boosting consumption. 
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IMPLICATIONS FOR FISCAL POLICY 
The choice between utilizing either expenditures or tax rate changes 
for stabilization purposes is dependent on the policy needs at hand. Go-
vernment spending has been useful in determining long-run national need$, 
whereas tax changes may be more appropriate for stabilizing the economy when 
short-run cyclical considerations areat stake. 
As the results from this study have confirmed, tax rate changes have 
accelerated consumer spending without changing the consumers' marginal pro-
pensity to consume. Nost tax cuts take the form of the withholding system 
for wages and salaries. Moreover, the effect of tax cuts on a wage earner ' s 
take-home pay is difficult, if not impossible to differentiate from other 
changes in income . 
The real power of a tax cut program is achieved through what Pechman 
calls the 'perverse short run effect' (1977). Generally speaking, a tax rate 
cut will leave consumers with larger after-tax incomes, thereby leading to 
direct increases in consumer demandor consumer spending . The increase in 
demand will spur on consumer goods production. Increased production leads 
to further consumer spending, generating additional inertia to production 
and income . Thus, through the multiplier effect, GNP is increased by an 
amount exceeding the original tax cut dollars. Heller estimates that the 
dollar amount of withheld taxes during 1964 was half of the resultant con-
sumption .gain through the multiplier process. He calculated that an appro-
ximation of the consU!Uption multiplier for a tax cut is "close to two" 
( 1968, p. 41) . 
It would be misleading to criticize tax cut programs as being too 
insubstantial to have a significant stabilization effect. The naive in-
ter pretation of the effectiveness of a tax cut ignores the multiplier effect . 
After averaging the tax cut to dollars per tax rate, the total dollar effect 
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may be less than $5 a week per tax payer . This number in terms of GNP is 
at leas t 1 - 2% of GNP. The resulting stimulus to the economy can be 
powerful, g'iven the multiplier effect. 
As demonstrated through regression analysis , treating temporary tax 
cuts . (i. e. 1970~ 71 and 1975) as permanent yieldsinsignif icant results. 
Temporary tax cuts alter n~atherthe shape of the consumption function, 
nor t he level of consumer spending in the short .run. According to the 
PIH , temporary tax cuts become a component of the error term (Wallis, 19if3 ). 
The difficulty of obtaining robust estimates of the tax cut proxy had 
been experienced by past researchers on the issue of Government Tax Cut 
or Surcharge Programs (Blinder 1981, Juster, . 1977). In an aggregate study, only 
tentative conclusions can be made about individual behavior. The sum total 
effect of individual spending r eveals that an announcement raises the level of 
consumer spending, although the MPC clearly stays fixed. From this obser-
vation, we may extrapolate further: tax cuts of a permanent nature are 
treated as any other income disturbance . Out of the expanding income pie, 
the same marginal propensity to consume is applied. 
By pure definition consumers allocate income gains between consumption 
and savings. Both on the average and on the margin, it would be fair .to say 
that the majority of disposable income is consumed. If a tax-cut gain of a 
permanent nature is treated no differently than other increases 'in income, we 
would expect most of it to be consumed. The premise of the· PIH derived 
model, is that tax-cut dollars are treated like~other dollars of additional 
income . Our results have yielded consumption-income relationships in which 
the MPC is close to average values found in other recent consumption studies . 
-Besides raising consumer spending, a tax cut "announcement" could 
raise consumer expectations and consumer confidence. Our high tax cut 
coefficient value could reflect the affect of induced confidence in t he economy -
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Policy makers are often wary ' of implementing a permanent tax cut if there 
i s a reasonabl e chance that full emploY>m'ltt ,· can be reached through automatic 
stabilization alone. In 1 964, Heller persuaded Kennedy, Johnson, and Congress 
that the full-employment surplus was dragging the economy down. The ensuing 
20% personal tax cut aided the ailing economy . Due to the timing bf the 
tax cut .. program, inflation was held off until the Vietnam War • ••• two years 
later (Baily, 1982 ). 
According to Eckstein (1 979 ), during the great recession in 1974-5, double 
digit inflation was occurring whereas consumer spending had fallen 2.3% iIi 1974 . 
At first , it was believed that taxes should be increased to cut back on in-
flation. However, once economic decline was evident, Congress enacted dis-
cretionary tax cuts. As a result, consumer confidence returned. 
Whether the success of Kennedy's 1964 tax cut program can be applied 
·~o today' s economy is an impor tant issue. Kemp-Roth advocates should not 
ignore the context und Z:'! r which Kennedy was able to carry out a successful 
anti-recession campaign. There were conditions within the 1960s economy 
conducive towards recovery which are lacking in the 1980s. Inflation was 
only 1.2%/year and unemployment around 5.6% at a time when the full employ-
Ia8l1t target was 4% (Baily/Okun, 1982: 87) . Heller commented that in the 
1960s, the economy hSld both price stability and excess capacity. Because 
there was already a 30-3~ billion supply capacity in the economy, a tax cut 
could release purchasing power to individuals in order to absorb that supply 
capacity . 
The major objective of the 1964 tax cut was demand oriented. The 
implications 'of a tax cut in the Kennedy Administration was to increase 
aggregate demand accross the board to absorb a pre-existing .supply capacity . 
Kemp-Rothers on the other hand, sppport tax cuts from the ' supply-side·. 
Secretary of the Treasury , Donald Regan emphasized that the incentive tax 
/ 
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policy program must "reduce the tax barriers to work, savings, and invest-
ment. Be "rejects the simplistic view that the way to get the economy moving 
is by pumping up consumption and by fine-tuning demand in the short run 
(Hearings, 1981)." In a statement before the Committee of Ways and Means , 
he summarized that the intent of the President t s tax proposals w·~S to expand 
incentives and opportunities for socially productive efforts and savings for 
all tax payers . Tax reductions would "contribute to substantial increases 
in savings and investment". He compared the methodology of the Kennedy 
Program to the Reagan Tax Reform Act~ "Our individual tax cut proposals call 
for the same sort of tax reductions for individuals that were enacted in 
1964 . The Kennedy-Johnson cuts, like ours,focused on reducing marginal 
tax rates . Those cuts were give in two steps while ours call for cuts in 
each of 3 years (1981: 7) • " 
According to Heller , (1982 ) "for Kemp-Roth advocates to cite the 1964 
cut as a pure illustration of how a huge tax cut causes a surge in the 
supply capability of the economy is to misread facts (Okun/1982 :7). 
Since the 192 Os , Congress could afford to continue in a pattern of 
tax cuts,economic expansion, and the accumulation of surpluses. Today, 
however, our present unemployment is mainly of a structural nature, so 
there is not an available surplus of skilled labor. As a result, many econ-
omists fear that a massive tax reduction in the 1980s, unaccompanied by re.., 
ductions in government spending, would greatly magnify the rate of inflation. 
The s tudy has given some evidence that the Reagan and Kennedy tax cut 
programs had both induced consumer spending. Whether this was the original 
intent of the Reagan administration cannot hide the fact that the Reagan 
Tax Cut has performed consistently with what the Permanent Income Theory 
would predict. According to economic theory, Reagan may have achieved 




From Keynesian underpinnings , a model was constructed which was based 
on the Permanent Income Hypothesis . According to this hypothesis, consump-
tion depends on 'regular' or 'permanent' income and is not affected by tem-
porary changes in income. Given this hypothesis, we should find that 
temporary income tax changes would have relatively little impact on consump--
tion, and permanent tax cuts are treated like any other increment to per-
manent -income. 
A test using dummy variables in those quarters where an announcement 
was made confirmed that an announcement has no effect on MPC in the long 
run, but may have a negative effect on the intercept. However, when a 
variable was created , attempting to capture the extra spending effect 
induced from a dollar increase or decrease in taxat.ion, the results were not 
wholl~r acceptable. 
Initial estimates using the tax cut proxy: (RATEt-RATEt_l )DUMT , in 
order to ferret out whether certain quarters would best capture the consumers ' 
anticipation of a permanent tax cut were not profitable. Through each 
regres sion, the problem of collinearity between income and tax payments 
masked the pure tax cut effect. Thus, the proxy "tax cut" variable picked 
up positive income-consumption ef fects . The two quarters in which permanent 
tax rate cuts were announced: 1964:1 and 1981:4, did have enough of a 
cons umption induceme nt effect to dominate the income-tax cut relationship. 
This was not true, however , of either the 1970, 1968 or 1975 temporary tax 
changes~ When these quarters were included, a highly significant positive 
coefficient resulted. Why was the 1975 Tax Cut considered to be more 'tem-
porary' than the 1964 or 1 981 tax cut programs? The issue involves the level 
of consumer optimism and a number of other variables based on the presence 
of i nflation, unemployment, or recession at the time the tax cut was carried 
• 
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The implications of the findings suggest that policy makers should be 
aware that the efficacy of their tax policy depends in part on the temporal 
nature of the tax cut, A" permanent ' cut will induce consumers to spend as 
they would from any other increment to their permanent disposable income . 
Moreover, the spending response will take place with a shorter lag than 
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